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Abstract
As Internet streaming of live content has gained on tradi-
tional cable TV viewership, we have also seen significant
growth of free live streaming services which illegally provide
free access to copyrighted content over the Internet. Some of
these services draw millions of viewers each month. More-
over, this viewership has continued to increase, despite the
consistent coupling of this free content with deceptive ad-
vertisements and user-hostile tracking.
In this paper, we explore the ecosystem of free illegal live
streaming services by collecting and examining the behav-
ior of a large corpus of illegal sports streaming websites.
We explore and quantify evidence of user tracking via third-
party HTTP requests, cookies, and fingerprinting techniques
on more than 27,303 unique video streams provided by 467
unique illegal live streaming domains. We compare the be-
havior of illegal live streaming services with legitimate ser-
vices and find that the illegal services go to much greater
lengths to track users than most legitimate services, and use
more obscure tracking services. Similarly, we find that mod-
erated sites that aggregate links to illegal live streaming con-
tent fail to moderate out sites that go to significant lengths
to track users. In addition, we perform several case studies
which highlight deceptive behavior and modern techniques
used by some domains to avoid detection, monetize traffic,
or otherwise exploit their viewers.
Overall, we find that despite recent improvements in
mechanisms for detecting malicious browser extensions, ad-
blocking, and browser warnings, users of free illegal live
streaming services are still exposed to deceptive ads, mali-
cious browser extensions, scams, and extensive tracking. We
conclude with insights into the ecosystem and recommenda-
tions for addressing the challenges highlighted by this study.
1 Introduction
Countless studies in the past decade have examined misbe-
having websites which attempt to exploit users. Traffic to
these websites is often considered as driven by exploiting in-
nocent users, whether via phishing/spam, URL misdirection,
or other social engineering techniques. As a result, many se-
curity efforts towards protecting users from these websites
has focused on a) preventing users from ending up on these
sites at all and b) on making it difficult for sites to exploit
users without the users’ noticing, giving them the chance
to navigate away. However, such efforts fail to protect one
group of Internet users—those who are willing to tolerate
abnormal or undesirable web behavior because the service
they seek would otherwise cost money. As a result, websites
which illegally provide copyrighted content for free are able
to present user-hostile, even blatantly malicious interfaces
without fear of losing users as a result. Combine the behav-
ior of these websites with the large number of users that visit
them, and you have a phenomenon worth studying.
Of course, illegal live video streaming is not the only in-
stance which meets the aforementioned criteria. While on-
line piracy takes many forms, it has been traditionally domi-
nated by peer-to-peer platforms like BitTorrent. Despite this,
streaming presents an interesting use case—the attack vector
for BitTorrent platforms is obvious, as users are required to
download untrusted files outside the browser, and there is
little expectation of safety. Video streaming, on the other
hand, is often considered by users as a lower-risk alternative,
where the browser is assumed to provide protection from
harm. This perceived lower-risk has likely been a significant
factor in the meteoric rise of illegal video streaming, and is
an assumption worth investigating.
Like legitimate live video streaming services, illegal live
streaming services exist to profit their operators. Hundreds
of illegal live media streaming services and thousands of
link-aggregating websites have emerged to lure viewers with
free content and consequently attempt to monetize their
ill-gained traffic through deceptive ads, malware, tracking,
and other malicious behavior [23]. Users willingly to ex-
pose themselves to these risks by clicking through warnings
and intrusive overlay ads in order to received paid content
for free—even though this intrusive and malicious behav-
ior would discourage them from visiting legitimate websites.
Many of these sites receive millions of visits each month,
which likely places them among the most visited sites that
deliberately exploit their users. The surfeit of users that will-
ingly expose themselves to malicious behavior on these web-
sites puts these sites in a uniquely abusable position.
Previous research has focused on understanding and clas-
sifying the sites which aggregate links to these illegal
streams [23], illegal on-demand streaming cyberlockers [12],
or the security and privacy of legitimate streaming sites [18].
In this study, we explore the ecosystem of free illegal stream-
ing services with a specific focus on services which host
streams to live broadcasts. These websites are highly tran-
sient in nature: they may change domains frequently, inten-
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tionally avoid being indexed by search engines, and only host
paths to live streams for the duration the event is live (redi-
recting to an innocuous page after an event is over). Conse-
quently, these sites often avoid the scrutiny of law enforce-
ment and researchers. To study illegal live streams, we use
live sports streams as a proxy. Sports media rights are esti-
mated to be valued at $20.6B by 2019 [11]. Illegal live sports
broadcasts are primarily viewed live by millions of viewers
each month, making it a reasonable representative of the live
streaming ecosystem. Further, given the quantity and diver-
sity of these sites, we hypothesize that the malicious behav-
iors of these websites represents a decent survey of malicious
tactics used on the Internet today by websites without fear of
regulatory retribution.
Contributions Our methodology for studying the free ille-
gal live streaming ecosystem consists of three main phases:
(1) collecting links to illegal live streams, (2) storing the
source and recording the behavior of these websites, and (3)
analyzing this data for evidence of malicious behaviors. To
summarize our contributions, in this study, we present:
• A contemporary snapshot of the free illegal live stream-
ing ecosystem, showing that the number of channel
providers has increased since [23] and that mainstream
sites are used as aggregators (Section 3).
• A system for automatically detecting new links to ille-
gal live streaming sites as they appear, and for subse-
quently crawling these sites to collect information on
them (Section 4).
• Evidence that illegal streaming sites seek to track and
identify users, suggesting that these entities may have
profiles for their viewers (Section 6.1).
• A comparison of illegal and legal live stream sites illus-
trating how illegal sites are more interested in tracking
users (Section 6.2).
• Evidence that moderation and crowd-source voting are
likely less effective than users expect at protecting them
from malicious sites (Section 6.3).
• A collection of case studies for illegal live streaming
websites which serve as a lens into how modern cyber-
criminals attempt to exploit naive users. (Section 7).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 highlights related work and frames our study in the
context of previous literature. Section 3 presents the ecosys-
tem of illegal live streaming services. Sections 4 and 5
describe our methodology for gathering and analyzing our
dataset. Section 6 presents our results. Section 7 dives into
illustrative examples of illegal streaming sites. We discuss
the implications of our observations in Section 8, provide
recommendations in Section 9, and conclude in Section 10.
2 Related Work
Web Security. Many developments in web security have
worked to minimize the risk that malicious websites can
present to unsuspecting users. Here, we discuss three of
these. First, tools like ad-blockers work to hide advertise-
ments on a site, which may reduce a user’s exposure to de-
ceptive advertisements that link to scams or malware. Some
deceptive ads can be detected automatically [6]. However,
this is an arms race, as anti-ad-blocking techniques have also
improved [20, 13]. Second, work on designing user experi-
ences and warnings that clearly alert users when their privacy
may be at risk, such as security warnings, have been shown
to be effective in practice [2, 9]. Third, browser sandboxing
has been employed to ensure that access by websites to vul-
nerable aspects of the system is limited by specific browser
UI, such as directing all downloads to a specific directory,
limiting read access to files to certain OS-provided contexts,
and presenting JavaScript alerts outside of the rendering en-
gine [3]. However, online piracy presents a unique scenario
in which users are often willing to ignore and bypass these
security warnings in order to obtain paid content for free.
Measuring Online Tracking. [7] presents extensive mea-
surements of online tracking across the Alexa top million
websites and presents OpenWPM, the tool we utilize in our
work to collect data on illegal stream URLs. Similarly, [4]
studies third-party tracking on websites and mobile applica-
tions while [10] examines the differences in tracking activity
between geographic locations. While these studies measure
tracking on the web generally, they do not differentiate be-
tween sites, and none focuses specifically on sites for which
visiting these sites could be considered criminal activity.
Illegal Media Streaming. [18] studies security and pri-
vacy concerns related to on-demand media streaming ser-
vices and targets platforms that are known to host illegal
content. Specifically, they study over 20 media streaming
platforms (e.g., Kodi, Enigma 2, MediaTomb, etc.) and their
attack surfaces, and find that there are over 100,000 devices
using these platforms which are discoverable through simple
search queries. Similarly, [12] explores the ecosystem of il-
legal streaming from the perspective of video piracy, where
content is streamed on-demand, as opposed to our work,
which will focus specifically on live-streamed content. [17]
studies the architectures and protocols used to stream illegal
content over the Internet and explores the value chain from
content acquisition, preparation and distribution, web host-
ing, and content discovery. This study considers peer-to-peer
streaming as well as web streaming, but does not study ma-
licious behavior outside of breaking copyright law.
Illegal Live Media Streaming. [23] studies the ecosys-
tem of free live streaming websites with an analysis of over
5600 live-streaming domains discovered from live-streaming
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Figure 1: An overview of the ecosystem of illegal live streaming services. In some cases, media providers, channel providers,
and/or aggregators may be controlled by a single entity.
domains through aggregator websites. This study does not
focus on user tracking, and instead highlights other aspects
of their behavior such as trademark infringements, malware
distribution, and anti-ad-block techniques, and uses these in-
tuitions to build a classifier of these sites. Though this study
is over two years old, it notably does not include Reddit as
one of their aggregators, despite our finding that Reddit is
now one of the most popular aggregators (see Section 4).
3 The Illegal Live Streaming Ecosystem
In the ecosystem of free live streaming services, there are
five main parties involved. The relationships between these
parties are illustrated in Figure 1 and described below.
Media Providers acquire and stream media content. A me-
dia provider may be a single individual streamer sending
a video stream using software like OBS1, or a large entity
such as a broadcasting station. In the context of illegal live
streams, an example of a media provider is an individual who
has a subscription to a paid service, and rebroadcasts this
content for free in real time.
Channel Providers (CPs) provide the infrastructure for
live-streaming media through a media server, which receives
live video streams from media providers and serves the
streams to users. These entities host the webpages on which
streams can be viewed. As such, the webpages of channel
providers are where users ultimately land when searching
for and viewing illegal live streams. In the context of legit-
imate websites, Twitch and YouTube are examples of chan-
nel providers. Examples of illegal services include sites like
buffstreamz.com or watchsport.fun 2.
Aggregators collect links to a variety of channel providers
1Open Broadcaster Software (https://obsproject.com/)
2Author’s note: The ads displayed on websites analyzed in this study
vary frequently and widely, and any of the sites referenced in this paper
may at times display ads for adult content. Please take appropriate caution
if you choose to visit them.
to allow users to discover and browse streams that are avail-
able to view. Some aggregators may offer search function-
ality (e.g. Reddit) while others simply offer a list of streams
which are available for viewing at the current point in time
(e.g. firstrowonly.eu). Some aggregators use crowd-
sourcing to gather URLs, while others may be run by a single
individual or automated service. In some cases, aggregators
themselves may also serve as channel providers, such that
when a user clicks on a link to a live event, they do not leave
the aggregator domain.
Advertisers allow media providers, channel providers, and
aggregators to monetize their services through ads and over-
lays. Advertisers may be individuals or ad networks, and
play a key role in this ecosystem. Typically, aggregators and
channel providers will run JavaScript code which fetches ad-
vertisements from an ad network. These ads may be banner
ads, or more intrusive overlay ads that a user is compelled
to click in order to view a live stream, and typically open
a new tab that is redirected for tracking before ending on an
advertisement page. These advertisement pages are often de-
ceptive or blatantly malicious, with many offering benefits in
exchange for the user installing a browser extension.
Users are the individuals watching these free illegal live
streams on these potentially malicious websites.
4 Methodology
Our investigation is organized into three phases.
Phase 1: Collection. In Phase 1, we identify a list of
popular aggregators. Because we are most interested in un-
derstanding the behavior of channel providers (who host the
video pages users ultimately land on when watching a live
stream), we select eight popular aggregators (based on their
Alexa rankings) found in search engines, along with Reddit.
Notably, adding Reddit represents a departure from prior
research on this topic. Reddit is a top 20 website globally and
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is hosted in the United States, making it substantially differ-
ent from the aggregators described in [23]. Further, Reddit
is different from other social media platforms such as Face-
book and Twitter in that the subreddits via which these links
are available are public, where sharing is not dependent on
friend networks, and where viewing links does not require
users be a member of the Reddit platform. We manually
identify 14 subreddits which focus exclusively on aggregat-
ing links to illegal sports streams. A comprehensive analysis
of Alexa and SimilarWeb data on Reddit indicates that Red-
dit receives between 16 million and 85 million visits a month
just from users looking for sports streams.
We monitor these aggregators for five weeks (11/2018 to
12/2018), to build a database of channel providers linked to
by these aggregators3. Our collection code scraped each of
these aggregators every 15 minutes for this five week period.
Phase 2: Crawling. In Phase 2, we automatically crawl
these websites using our own fork of OpenWPM v0.8.0 [7],
which is built upon Firefox and Selenium. OpenWPM allows
us to collect data about a webpage such as cookies, HTTP re-
quests, and JavaScript calls. By default, OpenWPM simply
visits a webpage and collects information about the content
that is immediately available. In our experience, however,
we find that many of these websites redirect to what appear
to be more malicious pages only when a user attempts to
click on the “play” button of the video. As a result, we ex-
tend OpenWPM with commands for clicking the webpage
and collecting data about the resulting behavior. Due to time
constraints, we do not crawl all of the URL we harvested in
Phase 1. Instead, we take a sample of the most recently har-
vested URLs from each channel provider in order to ensure
each is represented.
Phase 3: Analysis. Finally, in Phase 3, we analyze the
behavior of the visited webpages in the context of tracking.
To understand the tracking behavior of these websites, we
leverage EasyPrivacy4—a filter list which seeks to block web
tracking. We compare the domains of third party HTTP re-
quests and cookies against EasyPrivacy to determine which
of the requests and cookies set by a webpage are associated
with web tracking. Importantly, this metric likely underes-
timates the amount of tracking, since EasyPrivacy is not ex-
haustive and may fail to flag some resources as tracking [27].
Next, to understand the fingerprinting behavior of these
sites, we implement checks for canvas, font, and WebRTC
fingerprinting using the techniques described in [8]. Can-
vas fingerprinting is detected by a series of checks: (1) the
canvas element must be greater than 16px in height and
width, (2) the JavaScript on the page must not call save,
restore, or addEventListener, (3) the JavaScript must
attempt to save an image with toDataURL or getImageData
3Our collection code is available at https://github.com/
hudson-ayers/safe-sports-streams.
4https://easylist.to/
with a size greater than 16px × 16px. Font fingerprint-
ing is flagged when a site calls measureText 50 or more
times. WebRTC fingerprinting is detected by whether or
not the page accesses the localDescription property of
a RTCPeerConnection, as this property covers all possible
IP address retrievals. We then use the same techniques for
quantifying user tracking on legitimate sites in order to com-
pare the behavior of illegal and legitimate streaming sites5.
4.1 Tracking Score
We present a general metric for how malicious a particular
channel provider is based on the tracking techniques they
utilize. This metric follows:
score= 0.5∗ r+3∗ c+5∗ f (1)
where:
r = Ave. # of HTTP requests to tracking domains for
each visited channel provider URL.
c = Ave. # of cookies set by tracking domains for each
visited channel provider URL
f = # of unique of fingerprinting methods used by the
channel Provider. (Ranges from 0 to 3, i.e. a site
using both canvas fingerprinting and font
fingerprinting would have c = 2)
We evaluate this metric for each channel provider. The
higher the score, the more invasive a site is. We acknowl-
edge that these constants are relatively arbitrary. Our basic
reasoning is as follows: fingerprinting is the hardest tracking
mechanism to evade [1], and thus is given the highest mul-
tiplier. For tracking cookies and requests, we observe that
cookies are set less frequently, and scale them accordingly.
4.2 Limitations
First, many channel providers are protected by Cloudflare.
Although there are techniques to discover the true IP ad-
dresses through information leakage [21], we did not imple-
ment these checks. Consequently, our study does not include
detailed analysis about the true geolocation of the parties in-
volved in the illegal live streaming ecosystem.
Second, due to time constraints, we do not perform a mea-
surement of malware distributed by these websites. Open-
WPM does not include mechanisms for collecting malicious
downloads or browser extensions. We believe this is an in-
teresting area of future work and highlight some of the mali-
cious extensions served by these websites in Section 7. Fu-
ture work could also seek to detect drive-by-downloads [16].
5Our crawling and analysis code is available at https://github.com/
lukehsiao/price-of-free-illegal-streams.
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Table 1: Summary of Aggregator Sites
Aggregator Alexa Rank Monthly Visits (100k)
https://www.reddit.com‡ 18 16,000†
http://livetv.sx 1,380 8,100
http://rojadirecta.me 8,755 2,000
https://www.stream2watch.org 9,765 2,200
http://cricsports.sc 12,014 2,200
http://www.fromhot.com 21,680 170
http://firstrowonly.eu 27,001 1,100
https://www.mamahd.org 29,523 350
https://www.viprow.net 35,203 760
† Approximation of monthly traffic exclusively to live sports stream subreddits based
on search traffic leading to these subreddits: 16-85 million views.
‡ Specifically, we look at the following subreddits: /r/{boxing, cfb,
cricket, mlb, mma, motorsports, nba, ncaabball, nfl, nhl,
putt, rugby, soccer, wwe}streams.
Table 2: Top 10 Hosts for Channel Providers
Hosting Company Host Country AS # # CP % Streams
Cloudflare US 13335 160 53.46
Google US 15169 80 0.94
HostPalace NL 134512 20 0.55
NameCheap US 22612 19 0.20
MAROSNET RU 48666 18 0.94
Quasi Networks SC 29073 11 23.17
DigitalOcean US 14061 10 0.22
CompuByte GB 39572 9 0.01
Lala Bhoola SE 49453 9 0.36
BlueAngelHost BG 206349 9 0.22
4.3 Ethical Considerations
The purveyors of the illegal sites we study are breaking U.S.
copyright law, and this paper discourages illegal streaming.
We aim to observe a set of websites which large numbers of
users willingly and regularly visit despite circumstantial evi-
dence of malware and deceptive practices. Our methodology
benefits these illegal sites very little—while we may slightly
increase ad revenue in the process of our study, our visit
numbers are insignificant compared to the number of users
these sites attract daily. We are not personally taking revenue
from the copyright holders of this content, as the majority of
our crawls occurred through headless browsers that do not
display any video. Finally, any added views to these websites
from our study is likely offset by any increased awareness of
the hostile behavior that this study highlights.
5 Collection Results
As discussed in Section 4, we scrape stream URLs from sev-
eral manually selected popular aggregator sites. The aggre-
gators that we target are listed in Table 1.
Through these aggregators, we collect 151,661 unique
URLs, spread across 467 unique channel providers. Of
these, we could not identify a host for 2. Of the re-
maining 465 channel providers, we found that 160 (34%)
were protected by Cloudflare, which hides their true IP ad-
dresses. This data is summarized in Table 2 where 74%
of our channel providers are hosted by just 10 hosts. Fig-
ure 2 shows the global ranking distribution of the channel
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Figure 2: Distribution of Channel Providers by Alexa Rank.
providers—111 channel providers did not make the top mil-
lion. The top two Alexa-ranked channel providers were
youtube.com and twitch.tv—some streamers manage to
sneak live sports content past the filtering on these websites
using misleading names. Sites such as buffstreamz.com
and streamlabs.com were ranked about 2000 globally,
with buffstreamz.com ranked 344 in the U.S., ahead of
nhl.com and close to nba.com (the primary domains for
legally streaming NHL and NBA games).
6 Crawling & Analysis Results
We perform three analyses to illustrate the behavior of ille-
gal live streaming sites. We first measure user tracking with
respect to HTTP requests and cookies from known-tracking
domains as well as common fingerprinting techniques. Next,
we perform the same measurement on popular, legitimate
sports streaming websites in order to compare their behav-
ior with illegal streaming sites. Finally, we use the track-
ing score introduced in Section 4 to generally compare user
tracking across sites and to assess the efficacy of heavily
moderated aggregators in protecting users from tracking.
6.1 Evidence of User Tracking
As discussed in Section 4 we break user tracking down into
three categories: third-party HTTP requests, cookies, and
fingerprinting. We measured channel providers by the preva-
lence of each of these tracking techniques, and for each tech-
nique we ranked all of the channel providers we found by
using the tracking score for each channel provider, as de-
scribed in Section 4. These illegal streaming websites ex-
pose users to a significant number of requests and cookies of
known trackers. For each channel provider, we measure the
total number of third-party HTTP requests that are made on
each page we visit, the number of requests which are flagged
a tracking request by EasyPrivacy, and compute an average
over all pages for a particular channel provider. We do the
same for tracking cookies.
Next, we analyzed each webpage’s JavaScript behavior to
detect whether or not they were trying to perform device fin-
gerprinting based on a series of heuristics (see Section 4).
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Table 3: Channel Providers using Fingerprinting
Technique # CPs % CPs
Canvas Fingerprinting 237 50.75
WebRTC Fingerprinting 164 35.12
Font Fingerprinting 23 4.93
Table 4: Tracking Behavior of Top CPs by Tracking Score
Ave. #
Requests
Ave. #
Cookies C
an
va
s
Fo
nt
W
eb
R
T
C
Tracking
Score
Illegal Channel Providers
www.totalsportek.com 152.33 4.00  93.17
ko.rivosport.co 93.60 0.00   56.80
nowwatchtvlive.ws 108.23 0.00 54.12
in.xrivonet.info 81.71 0.00   50.85
rvo8z.blogspot.com 72.00 0.00   46.00
www.gatehd.com 67.70 0.13   44.25
www.linesports.club 56.87 0.00    43.43
streamhd247.com 63.30 0.03   41.75
www.time4tv.net 70.20 0.10  40.40
Legitimate Channel Providers
www.nba.com/nbatv 42.00 0.00  26.00
www.cbssports.com/live/ 38.67 0.00 19.33
www.espn.com/watch/ 32.00 0.00 16.00
www.tntdrama.com/watchtnt/ 14.67 0.00  12.33
www.nhl.com/tv/ 20.33 0.00 10.17
www.willow.tv/ 7.33 0.00 3.67
www.foxsportsgo.com/ 7.00 0.00 3.50
We summarize the number of channel providers suspected
of fingerprinting in Table 3. We observe that the 15 (3.2%)
channel providers, engage in all three forms of fingerprint-
ing. Similarly, 128 (27.4%) channel providers engage in both
canvas and WebRTC fingerprinting.
Table 4 displays the top 10 illegal channel providers or-
dered by tracking score, along with the prevalence of third-
party HTTP requests to trackers, tracking cookies, and fin-
gerprinting techniques used. We include the same informa-
tion for the legitimate sites we study in Section 6.2.
6.2 Comparison to Legitimate Sites
Observing the frequency of tracking on these sites is only
useful within the context of the frequency of such tracking
on other websites. To provide this context, we repeated our
measurement process for a small corpus of legitimate web-
sites via which users can pay to watch sports. Specifically,
we selected the services WatchESPN, NHLTV, CBS Sports,
WatchTNT, NBATV, Fox Sports Go, and Willow TV, be-
cause these are widely used services, and because they ex-
pose a viewing page accessible to non-logged-in users.
The results can be found in Table 4. A list of the most
frequently detected trackers exists in Table 5, alongside the
percentage of total tracking requests that each tracker was
responsible for. We find that the legitimate sites make signif-
icantly fewer requests to known tracking domains than the
worst illegal websites. We see that Google Analytics and
Table 5: Top Trackers
Trackers on Illegal Sites % All Tracking
www.google-analytics.com 27.84
cm.g.doubleclick.net 7.89
trk.vidible.tv 7.63
stats.g.doubleclick.net 4.14
px.moatads.com 3.79
counter.yadro.ru 2.92
c.mgid.com 2.56
d3.c3.b1.a1.top.mail.ru 2.43
k.streamrail.com 2.30
mc.yandex.ru 2.17
Trackers on Legitimate Sites % All Tracking
cm.g.doubleclick.net 18.60
analytics.twitter.com 4.32
ma61-r.analytics.edgekey.net 3.99
ib.adnxs.com 3.65
px.moatads.com 3.65
www.facebook.com 2.99
stats.g.doubleclick.net 2.99
ping.chartbeat.net 2.99
www.google-analytics.com 2.99
t.co/i/adsct 2.66
DoubleClick are the only top 10 trackers shared between il-
legal and legitimate streaming services. We also observe that
all of the trackers used by legitimate sites are either .com or
.net domains (the t.co domain is owned by Twitter). On
the illegal sites we find a much more diverse set of track-
ers, often with obscure names, and with some domains cor-
responding to countries outside the US (Russia and Tuvalu).
The biggest difference between the legal and illegal sites
shows up when looking at cookies and fingerprinting. For all
legal streaming sites analyzed, only 2 total instances of fin-
gerprinting behavior was observed, and none of the cookies
set by these sites were detected as tracking cookies according
to EasyPrivacy.
6.3 Efficacy of Moderation
It is interesting to analyze trends across streaming providers
and aggregators, to answer questions such as “Do moderated
streaming aggregators do a better job of filtering out the most
malicious websites?”. Specifically, we focus on the use of
Reddit as a moderated aggregator of illegal streams. Reddit
as an aggregator has exploded in recent years, likely taking
customers away from many of the other unmoderated aggre-
gators discussed in this paper. One reason for this may be
that viewers feel safer accessing streams linked to on sub-
reddits with moderators that promise to remove links which
violate subreddit rules. In fact, some subreddits go so far
as to mark certain streamers as “verified”, meaning that they
have been sharing their streams for an extended period of
time, have communicated personally with the moderators,
and have not been outed as abusing their users. As discussed
in Section 4, we rely on our tracking score metric to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of moderation by averaging the score of
each channel provider across the aggregators that link them.
The results of this can be seen in figure 3.
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Figure 3: Tracking Score by Aggregator.
This figure reveals that the distribution of tracking scores
reflects the nature of the aggregator site. For example, Red-
dit is crowd-sourced and manually moderated. Despite a
high number of submissions of highly variable quality (re-
flected in the large number of outliers), Reddit’s modera-
tion appears to help it maintain an average tracking score
that is lower than many of the other aggregators. In con-
trast, firstrowonly.eu is not crowd sourced and acts as
both an aggregator and channel provider. It exhibits much
less variance in tracking scores, along with a higher average
score, indicating more tracking activity. Ultimately, this fig-
ure shows that Reddit does not successfully moderate away
the worst websites by this metric, suggesting that moderation
is more helpful for filtering out non-functioning streams than
it is at removing sites that exhibit malicious behavior.
One other interesting aspect of Reddit is that users are able
to vote on the streams posted to this site. We were curious as
to whether this voting would punish sites which track users,
as we suspected that sites which track users might also be
more likely to display deceptive ads or other features which
annoy users. To do so, we plotted the average number of
upvotes on each post which linked to a channel provider
from a streaming subreddit against the tracking score of that
channel provider. In order to disregard posts which had not
been voted on much, we did not count posts with 0, 1, or
2 upvotes. The results of this can be seen in figure 4. As
this figure shows, there is minimal correlation between up-
votes and tracking score. This suggests that user opinions
are not a good method for distinguishing malicious sites in
this ecosystem.
7 Case Studies
We manually investigated several channel providers and ag-
gregators and noticed a wide variety of interesting techniques
and strategies which could be studied in future work. We
highlight several of the techniques we observed below.
Malicious Extensions As discussed in Section 4, limita-
tions with OpenWPM made it infeasible for us to conduct
a widespread study of malware on these sites. Despite this,
we did manually visit dozens of these sites and clicked on
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Figure 4: Tracking Score vs Upvotes on Reddit.
Table 6: Suspected Malicious Chrome Extensions
Extension Name # Users [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
MyTransitGuide 2,759,523      
StreamAll 154,978    
PDF Maker 124,072   
Television Fanatic 139021       
BigGamez ads 47,394   
StreamingTime 47,376    
ConvertoWiz 44,893   
Utilitool Search 34,272    
Stream-It.online Search 30,887   
Web Search 24,992    
SpeedTest3 ads 331   
[1] Display notifications.
[2] Read and change all your data on a limited subset of websites.
[3] Manage your apps, extensions, and themes.
[4] Replace the page you see when opening a new tab.
[5] Read your browsing history.
[6] Manage your downloads.
[7] Read and change all your data on the websites you visit.
“download now” and other similar links which we thought
were most likely to lead to malware (these links were typi-
cally accompanied by some promise of helpful software or
free media). Almost always, these links would open a new
webpage in another tab, and this new webpage would pro-
vide instructions on how to install a specific Chrome exten-
sion, alongside some claim that the extension was necessary
to use whatever product the original link promised. These
extensions were accompanied by vague descriptions and few
or no reviews, and most were uploaded to the Chrome Web-
store within the last couple of months. These extensions of-
ten had the ability to read users entire browsing history, and
to read and modify data on all websites users might visit.
Some even had the ability to replace the page users see when
they open a new tab and manage users downloads folder. No-
tably, some of these extensions had tens or hundreds of thou-
sands of users. Limited existing reviews largely corroborated
our suspicion that these extensions were adware or spyware.
A description of these extensions can be found in Table 6.
We did not go so far as to install these Chrome exten-
sions, but we have little doubt that their sole purpose is to
record and sell data to advertisers, or to steal users informa-
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Figure 5: Embedded live stream amid innocuous content on
mokoshalb.com. On some sites, when a stream is over, the
video element is removed, leaving only innocuous content.
tion when they visit other websites. This observation is note-
worthy in light of the claim made in [26]: “We detect and re-
port 192 deceptive Chrome extensions. . . all have since been
disabled. Our techniques for catching these extensions are
now used by Google to scan new and updated extensions.”
Clearly, this method has not been particularly successful, as
these extensions still appear to be a preferred method of ex-
ploiting end users. Successful maintenance of browser ex-
tensions will likely benefit from coordinated efforts of mul-
tiple viewpoints [5] using a variety of techniques [15].
Hidden/Disguised Streams. Several channel providers
employed techniques to hide or disguise the URLs of their
live video streams. In many cases, it is to the channel
provider’s benefit that their site appears innocuous to some-
one casually browsing search results in order to not draw
attention to their illegal activity. We found two notable
examples of this technique. First, is buffstreamz.com,
whose homepage appears to contain links to innocuous
sports news, but serves streams through hidden paths (e.g.,
buffstreamz.com/watch/nba-1.php) that redirect back
to the homepage whenever the stream is not live. Second,
is mokoshalb.com, whose homepage does not contain any
content, but contains meta information suggesting the web-
site contains tutorials and tech tricks. mokoshalb.com takes
this one step further by also disguising the URL and the con-
tent of the video stream page itself (Figure 5). Other example
stream URL paths are shown in Table 7.
Legitimate Affiliate Links Some sites took an indirect
approach to monetizing ads by forcing users to follow
redirects to Amazon product pages via their own affiliate
links in order to watch the provided streams. We found
that firstrowonly.eu occasionally redirects users to such
Table 7: Example URL paths from mokoshalb.com
URL Path
/2017/04/top-12-google-search-tricks.html
/2017/04/seo-strategies-for-internet-marketing.html
/2016/06/9-things-to-consider-before-launching.html
/2016/06/advantages-and-disadvantages-of-free.html
/2016/06/how-to-make-money-with-affiliate.html
Figure 6: Techniques for gaining browser permissions
Amazon product pages with their own affiliate links the first
time a user clicks anywhere on the page, and that clicking
“watch now” ads on the page occasionally redirects to the
Hulu trial page with an associated affiliate link.
Obfuscation Another common theme we found when visit-
ing these websites was that they would go to varying levels of
effort to disguise their habits from a casual investigator. For
example, We observed that watchkobe.info/espn.php
modified its behavior if the Chrome Developer Tools tab was
opened, immediately hiding all ads as well as some overlay
iframes that redirect to external pages. Additionally, we
often encountered URLs that were hidden from any casual
scans through URI encoding or Base64 encoding the URLs
in the page source, and then having onClick methods de-
code these URLs before navigating to them.
Browser Alerts A particularly nasty technique which we
frequently encountered involved sites tricking users into be-
lieving they could only play video, or only close the window,
if they first accepted a browser notification, via arrows on the
page that pointed at where the browser notification would ap-
pear. An example of this is shown in Figure 6.
8 Implications
As seen in Section 6, tracking on illegal live streaming web-
sites is widespread via third party HTTP requests, cookies,
and device fingerprinting. We want to draw attention to the
significance of such tracking. Though these free streaming
websites are able to collect device fingerprints and cookies,
these sites rarely request access to the actual identity of users,
and thus, such tracking may seem inconsequential. Accord-
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ingly, we direct readers to [19, 1], to remind them that link-
ing fingerprints to identities is often possible post-collection.
For example, these websites could sell these unique profiles
to any online entity that does have access to user identity,
such as an ISP, an email operator, or a social network. These
entities would then be capable of comparing this known user
identity and their own collection of fingerprints with the fin-
gerprints obtained from these illicit sites, thus obtaining a list
of people who view illegal streams. There are many scenar-
ios in which a legitimate company could benefit from such
a list—it could be useful for targeted ads about low-cost TV
services or sports betting websites. A more salacious exam-
ple involves an ISP/cable company desiring to throttle the
Internet speed of any device suspected of violating the ex-
clusive broadcast rights of certain sports content. Such a list
could also be sold to more malicious actors and used as part
of a ransomware scheme in which users have to pay some
entity under threat of being exposed for viewing illegal con-
tent. These toy examples encompasses only a fraction of the
different ways in which such fingerprints could be used for
harm, and highlight that the tracking mechanisms detected
in this work are far from harmless.
9 Recommendations
Our experience studying free illegal live streaming sites has
led us to notice several common patterns which are used to
deceive users. Here, we make recommendations for address-
ing these issues. Our purpose in presenting these recommen-
dations is to highlight them as potential areas for future work,
and to encourage discussion around these issues. For the rec-
ommendations we present, we do not empirically evaluate
their efficacy, nor do we claim that they are infallible.
The most obvious pattern we found was that it was com-
mon for aggregators and channel providers to leverage trans-
parent iframes which covered the majority of the page, such
that a user is essentially coerced to first click on the iframe
before interacting with the page. This technique, which is
similar to clickjacking, has been a longstanding problem
with a variety of proposed solutions [22, 24, 25]. Building in
more robust clickjacking protections into common browsers
may help raise awareness and provide a baseline level of se-
curity for everyday users.
These deceptive overlays often prompt users to install ma-
licious browser extensions which masquerade as legitimate,
but instead inject advertisements or collect personal data. At
the time of this writing, the Chrome Webstore does not show
an extension’s version history and requested permissions up
front on the homepage of the extension. Furthermore, we
found that different versions of the same extension may dis-
play a different number of downloads and different reviews.
Different version can be directly linked to, but are not discov-
erable via search or from the latest extension page. Chrome
only shows the permission requested by an extension after a
user has consciously decided to click the “Add to Chrome”
button. In contrast, Firefox Add-ons show both the permis-
sions an add-on requires, and allows a user to browse the ver-
sion history before clicking “Add to Firefox”. With Chrome,
a user decides to add an extension, and then is shown the
permissions and given an opportunity to change her mind.
With Firefox, the user has all the information up front before
needing to make that initial decision, and is also given an
opportunity to change her mind.
In our experience, malicious browser extensions repre-
sented the most user-hostile behavior we found on these
websites. Notably, we were not prompted to download or in-
stall any binaries or desktop applications. All of the prompts
we encountered for malicious software took the form of
browser extensions. Although significant progress has been
made in recent years to fight malicious extensions [14], it
is clear that malicious extensions are still a prevalent attack
vector, and further work in automatic detection of potentially
malicious extensions would benefit users.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we extend and update the body of work in-
vestigating illegal streams. We discover that the streaming
ecosystem has continued to expand, with Reddit emerging
as one of the largest aggregators of illegal streams. We col-
lect links to hundreds of thousands of streams over the pe-
riod of a month, and crawl these websites using OpenWPM,
which leads us to discover that these websites go to signif-
icant lengths to track users—and that they do so in a much
more comprehensive and unavoidable manner compared to
legal sports streaming websites. Further, our personal obser-
vations of dozens of channel providers lead us to the conclu-
sion that there is still a large range of options for monetizing
page visits beyond traditional ads for criminals willing to ex-
ploit users. We find that deceptive ads and full-page overlay
redirects are commonly used, and that techniques to deceive
users into installing malicious extensions are commonplace.
Further, the frequency with which we observe tracking and
distribution of user specific information implies that these
sites also monetarily benefit from from tracking users, in ad-
dition to serving advertisements. We caution that this might
indicate at least some of these sites are able to sell this track-
ing data to third parties, where these third parties could be
advertisers or more malicious entities.
We believe that this piece has shown that illegal stream-
ing represents a uniquely accessible view into misbehaving
websites on the Internet. These sites are by definition crim-
inal enterprises, but require substantial audiences in order to
profit—as a result, they are easy to locate, and make little at-
tempt to hide from security researchers. These sites serve as
an excellent case study of modern techniques used to profit
off of users, whether that be via deceptive ads, abuse of af-
filiate programs, user tracking, or distributing malware. We
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encourage future security research to take advantage of the
illegal streaming ecosystem as a resource for studying how
cybercriminals monetize page views, and a tool for measur-
ing modern tracking techniques employed on the web.
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